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A B S T R ACT. This article explores the middle-class response to life under the early Communist state in
Hungary. It is based on an oral history of the Budapest bourgeoisie, and challenges some of the dominant
indigenous representations of the central European middle class as persecuted victims who were forced into
‘ internal exile ’ by the Stalinist state. Despite being oﬃcially discriminated against as ‘ former exploiters ’,
large numbers achieved educational and professional success. Their skills were increasingly needed in the rapid
modernization of the 1950s, and the state provided them with semi-oﬃcial opportunities to remake themselves
into acceptable Communist citizens. Middle-class testimony revealed how individuals constructed politically
appropriate public personas to ensure their own upward mobility ; they hid aspects of their pasts, created
‘ class conscious ’ autobiographies, and learnt how to demonstrate suﬃcient political loyalty. The ways in
which individuals dealt with integrating into a system which oﬃcially sought to exclude them and which
many disliked ideologically is then examined. In order to ‘ cope with success ’, respondents in this project
invented new stories about themselves to justify the compromises they had made to ensure their achievements.
These narratives are analysed as evidence of speciﬁcally Communist middle-class identities.
I
During the early Communist period, the lives of the former middle class in
Hungary were transformed.1 On one hand, being oﬃcially deﬁned as a socially
* I would like to thank all the interviewees who were prepared to talk to me about their experiences
of Communism. I am grateful for postgraduate funding from the Arts and Humanities Research
Board, postdoctoral funding from the Economic and Social Research Council and support from the
Universities of Exeter and Plymouth, all of which enabled me to write this article. I would also like to
thank the anonymous Historical Journal readers, Robert Evans, Richard Crampton, Kate Fisher, and
the members of the University of Plymouth Humanities Seminar for commenting on earlier versions of
this piece.
1 This term includes those who came from interwar middle-class families. I use Ga´bor Gya´ni’s
deﬁnition of middle class to include the intellectual/professional classes (teachers, doctors, lawyers, and
so on), the independent bourgeoisie (businessmen and tradesmen), and state oﬃcials ; see Ga´bor Gya´ni
and Gyo¨rgy Ko¨ve´r, Magyarorsza´g ta´rsadalomto¨rte´nete a reformkorto´l a ma´sodik vila´gha´boru´ig (Budapest, 1998),
pp. 224–54. There were the sharp cleavages within the Hungarian middle class, in particular between
the more conservative ‘Christian national ’ gentry-dominated civil service, and the intelligentsia and
business communities who came from more heterogeneous backgrounds (including many of Jewish
origin). Despite this, historians have increasingly argued for the presence of an identiﬁable middle-class
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undesirable element under the Stalinist state of Ra´kosi resulted in discrimination
and persecution. Those who came from the old interwar middle class could be
negatively labelled, deported,2 excluded from high status roles in the workplace,3
or barred from university as a result of counterselective quotas which favoured
working-class students. On the other hand, a massive programme of modern-
ization, mainly through industrialization, required a vastly expanded elite of
managers and technical specialists.4 Despite anti-bourgeois state rhetoric, certain
well-educated or aspiring members of the old middle class were given the op-
portunity to achieve a limited amount of social mobility.
This article explores how members of the middle class found success in both
education and the workplace despite being oﬃcially excluded by the Communist
state.5 It shows how many ensured their upward mobility by playing the system,
inventing new pasts or public identities for themselves. The second part of the
article will examine howmembers of themiddle class dealt with their achievements
in a system that oﬃcially endorsed their exclusion and that many disliked. It will
argue that in order to ‘cope with success ’, the middle class invented new stories
about themselves, which justiﬁed the problematic moral implications of their
social mobility and reconceptualized their relationship with Communist power.6
Indigenous post-Communist central European scholarship has shown little
interest in studying the ways in which social groups beneﬁted from Communism,
especially in the period of ‘high Stalinism’ in the 1940s and 1950s. In these
interpretations, the middle classes have been presented either as victims or as
having emerged from the Communist experience unscathed, with their outlooks
and values unchanged. In some works, particularly by nationalist writers,
ethic and lifestyle, especially in interwar Budapest, that provided a coherent sense of class identity. See,
for example, Ga´bor Gya´ni, ‘A polga´ri ko¨ze´poszta´ly laka´sviszonyai Budapesten a ke´t ha´boru´ ko¨zo¨tt ’, in
Ga´bor Gya´ni, ed.,Magyarorsza´g ta´rsadalomto¨rte´nete II : 1920–1944 (Budapest, 2000), p. 466. In this project,
almost all respondents categorized themselves as middle class, on the basis of their upbringing.
2 See, for example, Tibor Dessewﬀy and Andra´s Sza´nto´, ‘Kito¨ro˝ e´berse´ggel ’ : a budapesti kitelepı´te´sek hiteles
to¨rte´nete (Miskolc, 1989).
3 There is a striking absence of literature on the experience of the professional workplace. There is
some information on doctors’ experiences in Gyo¨rgy A´da´m, Az orvosi ha´lape´nz Magyarorsza´gon
(Budapest, 1986). We know that counterselective procedures were used less frequently to determine
access to the workplace. However, class-based discrimination often occurred once in post. See Szonja
Szele´nyi, Equality by design : the grand experiment in destratiﬁcation in socialist Hungary (Stanford, 1998), p. 201
(n. 19).
4 For details of the large expansion in technical education which served the rapidly industrializing
economy, see Elinor Murray, ‘Higher education in Communist Hungary, 1948–1956’, American Slavic
and East European Review, 19 (1960), pp. 395–413, at p. 396.
5 Class-based exclusion from the university and workplace was only oﬃcially ended in the early
1960s. See A. J. Von Lazar, ‘Class struggle and socialist construction: the Hungarian paradox’, Slavic
Review, 25 (1966), pp. 303–13, for an exploration of how socialist modernization necessitated a retreat
from the rhetoric of class war.
6 For an exploration of how a diﬀerent social group ‘came to terms’ with its success under a
Communist state, see Marianne Liljestro¨m, ‘Success stories from the margins: Soviet women’s auto-
biographical sketches from the late Soviet period’, in Daniel Bertaux, Paul Thompson, and Anna
Rotkirch, eds., On living through Soviet Russia (London, 2004), pp. 235–51.
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Communism has been presented as an alien totalitarian system imposed from
outside with which victimized local populations did not interact.7 Some left-wing
and liberal writers constructed a model of central European (as opposed to east-
ern European) development, which presented the region’s societies as repositories
of western liberal, democratic, and market values, whose ‘natural instincts ’ were
denied by a succession of ‘eastern ’ authoritarian regimes.8 These western values
were considered most fully preserved within the middle classes, who protected
them from the ravages of Stalinism and were able to pass them on to a new
generation after 1989.9 However, giving more consideration to the experiences of
those who attempted to create manageable lives for themselves in such a system,
albeit in very diﬃcult circumstances, challenges the idea that the middle class
were solely victims and reveals the ways they were in fact altered by their inter-
action with the Communist state.10
The evidence for this article is primarily drawn from an oral history project
in which I interviewed men and women about their lives under the early
Communist state. I collected the experiences, views, and representations of edu-
cational attainment and professional careers from seventy-eight members of the
Budapest middle class born between 1907 and 1938. This was part of a wider oral
history project which also examined war memory, political expression, resistance,
and the social and private life of the middle class. The interviews were conducted
between 1998 and 2000. They averaged around three hours in length. There were
thirty-one female and forty-ﬁve male respondents. All interviewees were prom-
ised anonymity ; hence all names are pseudonyms.
7 For one public manifestation of this approach in the context of a contemporary Hungarian
museum, see Mark Pittaway, ‘The ‘‘House of Terror’’ and Hungary’s politics of memory’, Austrian
Studies Newsletter, 15 (2003), pp. 16–17. The ‘ totalitarian model ’, which places an emphasis on what
Stalinism destroyed or restricted rather than on what it created, is still the dominant paradigm in
Hungarian history writing. For a recent popular general work which uses this framework, see Igna´c
Romsics, Hungary in the twentieth century (Budapest, 1999), especially ch. 5.
8 This position has been strongly associated with leftist dissident voices: ‘ foreign domination pre-
vents us from exercising the western option … which represents our profoundest historical inclina-
tions’, Gyo¨rgy Konra´d, Antipolitics, qu. in Timothy Garton-Ash, ‘Does central Europe exist? ’, New York
Review of Books, 9 Oct. 1986, p. 47. See also Eleme´r Hankiss, East European alternatives (Oxford, 1990),
especially the introduction; Eleme´r Hankiss, ‘Demobilization, self-mobilization and quasi-
mobilization in Hungary, 1948–1987’, East European Politics and Societies, 3 (1998), pp. 13–42. In the
historical ﬁeld, see Jeno˝ Szu˝cs, ‘The three historical regions of Europe’, in John Keane, ed., Civil society
and the state : new European perspectives (London and New York, 1988), pp. 291–332; Andra´s Gero¨,
Hungarian society in the making: the unﬁnished experience (Budapest, London, and New York, 1995), ch. 1.
9 See, for example, Iva´n Szele´nyi et al., Socialist entrepreneurs : embourgeoisiement in rural Hungary (Oxford
and New York, 1988), ch. 7. See also Tibor Ga´ti and A´gota Horva´th, ‘A ha´boru´ elo˝tti kisva´rosi
ko¨ze´poszta´ly uto´to¨rte´nete’, Szociolo´giai Szemle, 1 (1992), pp. 81–96. They argue that those middle-class
groups who lost their status after 1945 were able to re-emerge after 1990 and regain their former
position. There is no consideration of whether the experience of the early Communist state actually
changed aspects of their identity or outlook. The Stalinist experience is forgotten as an unwanted
interlude which interrupted Hungary’s natural trajectory towards ‘embourgeoisment’.
10 For an example of this type of approach from the study of the Soviet Union, see Ekaterina
Foteeva, ‘Coping with revolution: the experiences of well-to-do Russian families ’, in Bertaux,
Thompson, and Rotkirch, eds., Living through, pp. 68–90.
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I I
In central-eastern Europe after the Second World War, most newly established
Communist states tried to exclude the former middle classes from higher edu-
cation, in an attempt to break their numerical dominance in professional and
intellectual ﬁelds. This was achieved to the greatest extent in Poland and East
Germany. In Poland, the loss of 77 per cent of the professional, government, and
business class during the Second World War made this task much easier.11 In East
Germany, the state’s long-term commitment to worker education, an aspirational
proletariat, and the ﬂight of middle-class students to West Germany ensured the
most worker-peasant-dominated student body and professional-intellectual elite
in the region.12 Elsewhere, the former middle class maintained a large presence in
higher education: in Czechoslovakia, for example, students from worker-peasant
backgrounds never ﬁlled more than 43 per cent of university places. Similarly in
Hungary the percentage of students from non-manual backgrounds attending
university hardly dropped from its immediate post-war level even in the period of
greatest anti-middle-class discrimination.13 In both cases, this reﬂected the failure
to recruit suﬃcient numbers of working-class students into a rapidly expanding
university sector.14 However, in Czechoslovakia the Communist Party did not
seriously attempt to challenge the dominance of its middle-class elite and thus
prospective students did not face the class-based counterselective quotas and the
anti-bourgeois rhetoric that greeted Hungarian university applicants.15 What
happened to the Hungarian middle class was therefore unique in central-eastern
Europe: they achieved upward mobility in large numbers in a system which
oﬃcially endorsed their marginalization. It was this contradictory experience of
oﬃcial discrimination combined with unoﬃcial opportunity which was to shape
much of the middle-class testimony recorded in this project.
From its inception, the Communist state promised to reduce drastically the pro-
portion of bourgeois students at Hungarian universities and developed sophisti-
cated mechanisms to exclude them. After 1949, an ‘entrance committee ’ ( felve´teli
11 Ma´ria M. Kova´cs and Antal O¨rke´ny, ‘Promoted cadres and professionals in post-war Hungary’,
in Rudolf Andorka and La´szlo´ Bertalan, eds., Economy and society in Hungary (Budapest, 1986),
pp. 139–52, at p. 151. This compares to a loss of 10 per cent of these social groups in Hungary during
the Second World War.
12 John Connelly, Captive university : the sovietisation of East German, Czech, and Polish higher education,
1945–1956 (Chapel Hill, 2000), pp. 273–9.
13 Albert Simkus and Rudolf Andorka, ‘ Inequalities in educational attainment in Hungary,
1923–1973’, American Sociological Review, 47 (1982), pp. 740–51, at p. 745. See also Szele´nyi, Equality by
design, pp. 125–6.
14 Czechoslovak elites failed to provide suﬃcient incentives to draw the younger generation of the
Bohemian working class, which was suspicious of social mobility, into the university system and the
new elite. See Connelly, Captive university, pp. 266–72. For an account of Hungarian industry’s reluc-
tance to give up its best workers for university education, and the problems that workers experienced
with ‘accelerated education’, see Szele´nyi, Equality by design, p. 127.
15 The Czechoslovak Communist state did not introduce quotas into higher education, did not
force students to deﬁne their social origins, and did not vet applications for political reliability to the
extent seen elsewhere. See Connelly, Captive university, pp. 269–70.
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bizottsa´g), consisting of an academic, a member of the Communist youth move-
ment, and a local party representative, controlled admissions.16 It was instructed
to look at candidates’ social background and academic prowess. Applicants were
judged on the basis of their personal ﬁle and application form (to¨rzslap), which
required information about family backgrounds, including parents’ occupations
both in the year of application and in 1938 (i.e. under the previous regime).17 The
entrance committee placed university applicants into one of three categories :
‘workers ’ (a very broadly deﬁned group which included working peasants and
all Communist cadres), ‘ intellectuals ’, and those to be excluded, known as the
‘x-class ’.
The vast majority of respondents, whose families had been members of the
interwar middle class, could have been placed into only two of these categories :
‘x-class ’ or ‘ intellectuals ’. In oﬃcial terms, the ‘x-class ’ was judged by class
background and political past : it included the children of the landowning aris-
tocracy, owners of factories or small companies, owners of apartment houses,
wealthy individuals, managers, political leaders, policemen, and military oﬃcers
of the old regime.18 The criteria oﬃcially used to categorize ‘ intellectuals ’ were
based solely on background; they included those whose parents had ﬁnished
tertiary education and were, after 1948, employed in professions within the cul-
tural or technical intelligentsia. In the early Communist period, the state prom-
ised to exclude all those applicants who were deﬁned as ‘x-class ’. Candidates
classiﬁed as ‘ intellectual ’ experienced spells of both marginalization and accept-
ance, according to the political climate.
In some cases, class deﬁnitions consigned respondents to total exclusion from
tertiary education. Such marginalization occurred where parents’ political or
economic backgrounds were considered to be extremely negative, or were very
well known, or where the individual was deemed ‘unreformable ’. One inter-
viewee, a ‘reactionary ’ member of the ‘x class ’, who came from a rich upper-
middle-class Buda home and whose father had been a minister in a pre-war
Horthy government, considered herself a middle-class relic and realized that
marginalization was inevitable. She was unable to go to university :
James : How did the Communist regime describe your social position?
Ma´ria : Badly. As a ‘bourgeois hangover ’ ( polga´ri cso¨keve´ny). That was the phrase which
was used to describe those of the middle class who had stayed (itt maradt ko¨ze´-
poszta´ly), the bourgeoisie, whom they were not able to help. We were called
‘bourgeois hangovers ’. A few of us remained here from the old middle class, those
who didn’t go, those who lived through it, [the state knew] that when we died then
a new generation would come.
16 Ja´nos Lada´nyi, Re´tegezo˝de´s e´s szelekcio´ a felso˝oktata´sban (Budapest, 1994), p. 47.
17 These were the questions on the application form for the University of Economics in Budapest.
See Szele´nyi, Equality by design, pp. 11–12. 18 Ibid., p. 12.
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Despite these cases of exclusion, many members of the old middle class did
attend higher educational institutions. The Communist takeover had only a mini-
mal eﬀect on the proportion of students from non-manual backgrounds who
attended university. One sociological study suggested that the percentage of sons
from non-manual backgrounds fell slightly from around 41 per cent in 1947 to a
ﬁgure of around 35 per cent for the early 1950s, whereas for daughters the ﬁgure
remained relatively constant at just under 20 per cent.19 The Columbia University
research project on Hungary, which interviewed e´migre´s who left after the 1956
uprising, discovered that only 18 per cent of their middle-class respondents had
been unable to gain university places.20 While ﬁgures from elite higher edu-
cational institutions suggested that class-based quotas were more successful, such
institutions had a vested interest in under-representing middle-class students, and
were probably unrepresentative of Hungarian higher education as a whole.21
Certainly the Communist elite were deeply concerned about the continued
presence of the former bourgeoisie ; one 1956 party report highlighted that
approximately half the cultural intelligentsia and 60–70 per cent of professionals
were still taken from the families of the old middle and upper classes.22 Although
not large enough to be statistically signiﬁcant, the sample from this project was
consistent with this evidence : only four out of forty-one middle-class respondents
who applied to attend tertiary education between 1948 and 1956 were completely
excluded.23 Moreover, for most of these respondents social mobility was not
19 Simkus and Andorka, ‘ Inequalities ’, p. 744. It is impossible to assess the extent to which diﬀerent
groups from the middle and upper classes were excluded, as these statistics do not distinguish between
diﬀerent types of non-manual occupations.
20 The Columbia University Research Project on Hungary (CURPH) interviewed around 125
Hungarians. They concluded that although the percentage of middle-class students had fallen within
the university system (as the system expanded), their absolute number remained high. It is diﬃcult to
use their statistics, however, as they conﬂate Communist deﬁnitions of class (x-class, intelligentsia) with
respondents’ self-deﬁnition (as middle class). Bearing this in mind, CURPH reported that ﬁve out of
twenty-eight middle-class students, one out of twelve students from ‘intelligentsia’ backgrounds, and
nine out of seventeen from ‘x-class ’ families were completely excluded. If these ﬁgures are totalled,
then 26 per cent (ﬁfteen out of ﬁfty-seven interviewees) of all those students which my project con-
sidered middle class were excluded from higher education in the CURPH research. See Elinor
Murray, Higher education in Communist Hungary (report), Columbia Research Project on Hungary, 1958,
deposited in the Bakhmeteﬀ Archive, Columbia University (henceforth BA), Box 30, Subject Files :
Report of Higher Education, pp. 15–16. See also Murray, Higher education (article), pp. 400–1.
21 Ja´nos Lada´nyi argues that class-based quotas at elite institutions were successful in the period of
high Stalinism, but that the proportion of working-class students fell away after 1956, eventually only
comprising 44–48 per cent of the student body in 1963. See Lada´nyi, Re´tegezo˝de´s e´s szelekcio´, p. 54. For
criticisms of this thesis, and the suggestion that the promotion of working-class students was not
successful even in the period of high Stalinism, see Szele´nyi, Equality by design, p. 13.
22 Antal O¨rke´ny, ‘A ta´rsadalmi mobilita´s to¨rte´nelmi perspektı´va´i ’, in Nikosz Fokasz and Antal
O¨rke´ny, eds.,Magyarorsza´g ta´rsadalomto¨rte´nete, 1945–1989 (2 vols., Budapest, 1999), II, pp. 177–92, at p. 186.
23 As the primary rationale of the interviews was to explore the ways in which some members of the
middle class found success, rather than to establish whether the middle class was successful as a whole,
it was not vital whether the sample was representative. However, it was unlikely that this project
signiﬁcantly overrepresented those who had been successful by self-selecting people who had achieved
upward mobility and thus still considered themselves middle class in the 1990s. When respondents
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regarded as unusual ; going to university was considered a normal (albeit com-
plicated) practice in middle-class milieus.
The old middle class managed to ﬁnd opportunities for upward mobility in part
because a programme of massive industrial expansion in early Communist
Hungary required a vastly expanded elite of managers and technical specialists.24
Student numbers expanded rapidly from 22,386 in 1949/50 to a peak of 60,687 in
1953.25 The failure of the state adequately to prepare suﬃcient numbers of stu-
dents from peasant and worker backgrounds,26 combined with the pressures of
meeting ambitious targets in the ﬁrst ﬁve-year plan, meant that quotas were
relaxed incrementally from the early 1950s onwards. In 1952, universities were
informed of the pressing need to admit students from old ‘ intellectual back-
grounds’.27 In 1953, controls on university scholarships were softened: grants
were no longer to be conﬁned to those from worker and peasant backgrounds. In
1954, at the third party congress, Ma´tya´s Ra´kosi announced that ‘ talent and
outstanding marks ’ would now be added as relevant criteria in higher education
admissions.28 Despite these changes, oﬃcial rhetoric still stressed the necessity of
excluding ‘ former exploiting classes ’ from the education system. Only in the early
1960s were class-based quotas oﬃcially eliminated and educational establish-
ments asked to judge candidates on the basis of their ‘preparedness, suitability
and moral attitude’.29
Despite evidence of their success in the system, there has been little interest
in examining how the former middle classes of east-central Europe experienced
upward mobility in the early Communist period. Since 1989, historians
suggested other ‘middle-class ’ individuals for interview, they usually did so according to pre-
Communist deﬁnitions of class ; hence those whose social status had declined during the Communist
period were still recommended as interviewees. Moreover, when asked to recommend ‘middle-class ’
respondents, many believed that I was exploring the Communists’ persecution of unwanted social
classes, and hence suggested those individuals who had experienced extreme forms of discrimination.
Thus those with particularly negative experiences may be overrepresented in this sample.
24 For this point, see Gyo¨rgy Pe´teri, Academia and state socialism: essays on the political history of academic
life in post-1945 Hungary and eastern Europe (New York, 1998), p. 3. This tension between the demands of
ideology and of rapid modernization also provoked debate over the ‘rehabilitation of the bourgeois
specialists ’ in the Soviet Union in 1931. See Sheila Fitzpatrick, Education and social mobility in the Soviet
Union, 1921–1934 (Cambridge, 1979), pp. 213–17.
25 See Andor Lada´nyi, Felso˝oktata´si politika, 1949–1958 (Budapest, 1986), p. 230.
26 Many applicants from peasant and worker backgrounds who had not completed secondary
education were prepared for university through a one year ‘ szake´rettse´gi ’ (‘express ’ A-level equivalent).
However, these students failed in much higher numbers once in higher education; at the Budapest
technical university, in 1949–50, between 35 and 45 per cent of ‘ szake´rettse´gi ’ students did not pass their
courses. This is probably a conservative estimate; university staﬀ were pressured into passing a pol-
itically acceptable minimum number of these students. See Murray, Higher education (article), p. 402.
27 Lada´nyi, Felso˝oktata´si politika, p. 49.
28 Such pragmatic manoeuvrings occurred elsewhere: in 1950, restrictions were lifted in Poland
for children of the ‘working intelligentsia’ (in particular the children of schoolteachers), whose co-
operation was seen as necessary for the fulﬁlment of the plan. See Connelly, Captive university, p. 239.
29 Sa´ndor Balogh and Sa´ndor Jakab, The history of Hungary after the Second World War, 1944–1980
(Budapest, 1986), p. 194, qu. in Szele´nyi, Equality by design, p. 15. On the 1960s retreat, see Von Lazar,
‘Class struggle’.
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have frequently taken the early Communist rhetoric of exclusion at face value :
the middle classes have primarily been presented as ‘demobilized’ victims and
the subtleties of their interaction with the Stalinist system have been left unex-
plored.30 Despite the state’s rhetoric of class warfare, however, the necessity
of maintaining bourgeois expertise in the education system meant that the
middle classes were given unoﬃcial chances to succeed. The state could not
be seen to be openly advancing members of formerly exploiting classes, however.
This meant that such opportunities required many members of the old middle
class to refashion themselves by ‘erasing’ their bourgeois backgrounds and in-
venting new ‘class conscious ’ versions of their pasts. Some historians have termed
this type of system a ‘biocracy’ :31 one in which an individual’s chances of
succeeding were determined by their ability to create a politically acceptable
public autobiography (o¨ne´letrajz). In Communist Hungary these were constructed
in curricula vitae and application forms at the point of university entrance and
in job applications. Individuals manipulated information about their family
or undertook political tasks in order to produce an appropriate version of their
life story that would ensure their suitability for advancement in the eyes of the
state.
Even some respondents from ‘x-class ’ backgrounds were able to refashion
themselves into acceptable Communist citizens. Testimony from this project sug-
gested that the Communist state provided social processes through which in-
dividuals could ritually cleanse themselves of their class stigma. Those who were
deﬁned as ‘x-class ’ were expected to employ the most extreme techniques to
demonstrate that they were ‘ free from contempt for physical labour’ (nem veti meg a
gyerek a ﬁzikai munka´t). This meant practising downward social mobility, such as
taking employment in a working-class profession.32 Flo´ra, for example, was
excluded from grammar school as her family were labelled ‘bourgeois ’ and ‘cleri-
cal ’ members of the ‘x-class ’. After being expelled, the authorities suggested that
if she publicly shed her bourgeois background and worked as a labourer, this
would compensate for her poor genealogy and she would be able to return to
secondary school. When in 1953 there was a slight political relaxation, she was
able to apply for university entrance. However, she judged that she was still
negatively perceived by the state, so chose a university less politicized than those
in Budapest :
30 See, for example, Hankiss, ‘Demobilization’.
31 See Lutz Niethammer, Biographie und biokratie : nachdenken zu einem westdeutschen oral history-projekt in
der DDR fu¨nf Jahre nach der deutschen vereinigung, Paper presented at the ‘International oral history con-
ference’ (Sao Paulo, 1995) ; Daniela Koleva, Between testimony and power : autobiographies in socialist Bulgaria,
Paper presented at the conference ‘Texts of testimony: autobiography, life-story narratives and the
public sphere’ (Liverpool, 23–5 Aug. 2001) ; Galia Valtchinova, ‘Ismail Kadare’s The H-File and the
politics of memory’, in Daniela Koleva, ed., Talking history : papers of the international oral history conference,
Kiten, 24–27 Sept. 1999 (Soﬁa, 2000), pp. 172–83.
32 See Szele´nyi, Equality by design, p. 126. For other examples, see John Madge, Deprivation experiences
in Hungary, CURPH, BA, Box 30, Folder: Report on deprivation experiences in Hungary, 1945–56.
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James : And could you tell me something about your family background?
Flo´ra : Well, my father was a watchmaker and jeweller in this small town. Before the war
he had at least one helper to assist him, but after the war he had none. Nevertheless,
because of this particular trade, that’s why we were called bourgeois … I managed
to end up with a very good mark at the end [of middle school], and I was expected
to continue and go into the local grammar school. But that coincided in Hungary
with when children were judged on whom their parents were, what their aﬃliations
were, what strata of society they were associated with, and my family was labelled
‘bourgeois ’ and ‘clerical ’, and with this double burden I was barred from entering
grammar school. In fact, I couldn’t enter any kind of education after the age of
fourteen, and I was absolutely devastated – so was my family. My family tried to do
everything, whatever they could. I went and attended private classes with teachers
who were ﬁrst class but couldn’t teach any longer because they weren’t appropriate
for the Communist regime. That went on for about a year, then my family was told
that if I do physical labour – let’s say two, three, maybe even four years, maybe
there is going to be some redemption and then I could go to secondary school. So I
tried to work in all sorts of places, but not being used to it, it was pretty daunting. I
was working in a paprika mill in my home town, because my home town is very
famous for its paprika … and I became very ill, and somehow that coincided with a
slight relaxation of the rules, and I was told, when I recuperated, that I could
continue33 … Although I came top of my class, I was advised that I had to be very
careful when I applied to university, because I might not get into university with
this background at all. And, um, therefore I didn’t apply for a place in Budapest,
because I was absolutely certain that I wouldn’t get in, and judging by what hap-
pened to some of my contemporaries, who were in a similar position to myself, that
was a very wise move. But I applied for a place at the university of Szeged, and I was
called for an interview, and, yes, I was accepted. So in 1954 I went up to university
in Szeged, studying Hungarian language, literature and history.
Many of those who came from stigmatized ‘x-class ’ backgrounds were not able
to throw oﬀ their bourgeois heritage through these oﬃcial channels, and there-
fore decided to conceal crucial information about their pasts if it was the only way
to ensure university admission.34 Interviewees acquired a keen sense of the extent
of their biographical liabilities in the eyes of the state and the degree to which
their family’s past had to be modiﬁed. It was a potentially hazardous strategy : any
disguise risked discovery and might result in expulsion from higher education.
Magda’s grandparents were rich landowners, her father was an appeals judge
under the Horthy regime and she had been educated in Switzerland. She con-
cealed information about her relatives’ occupations but was expelled when her
background was uncovered:
James : Did you tell the truth [on your CV]?
Magda: No, no, rather, I should say, I had to [lie]. I didn’t write down my family’s land or
the factory. Because if I had written it down, I would not have been admitted.
33 This was in 1953 with the introduction of Imre Nagy’s ‘New Course’.
34 This point is also made in Szele´nyi, Equality by design, p. 126.
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It was a common technique that people tried to deny the reality of their pasts, or
simply tried very hard to present something in a certain way. There were jokes.
There was a person I knew who owned a forest, but he said that he was a forest
ranger. A person who was a landowner said that he was a servant (laughs). So
there were these jokes in middle-class circles, but this was how it really was.
James : And did it [lying on your CV] cause you any problems later ?
Magda: That I didn’t write those things down, and they found out? Yes. It came out
because of the silent system of informers they had, the mass of anonymous
reports … because then after the 1956 trial [of her husband] notes came out and
we saw, that there was … a tip oﬀ … we had no idea who it was and we still
don’t know … they found out and they used it to kick me out of university.
Not all respondents from middle-class backgrounds had to resort to these
extreme measures. Those whose parents were in intellectual professions such as
medicine or teaching, had not held high-ranking posts in the Horthy adminis-
tration or army, were not considered to have ‘reactionary ’ political views, or had
expertise considered potentially useful to the economy, were classiﬁed as ‘ e´rtel-
mise´gi ’ (intellectual) rather than ‘x-class ’. After 1952, the educational opportunities
for those deﬁned as ‘ intellectual ’ were mixed. On one hand, these students had
an expectation of upward mobility. Pa´l thought that he would be successful even
though his father had published illegally and been a member of the freemasons,
and Pa´l himself had tried to escape the country : ‘ I was ‘‘ e´rtelmise´gi ’’
[intellectual] … I had a ﬁle of being a somebody they would have to try to win. ’
On the other hand, they realized that they were not as favoured as students from
worker-peasant backgrounds and that their opportunities might be circumscribed
at certain points according to the political climate. A´gnes described the ambigu-
ous way in which ‘ intellectuals ’ were treated. Her husband had come from a
conservative and deeply anti-Communist family, but despite this he was valued
for his technical knowledge and incorporated into the Communist intellectual
elite. However, being unwilling to compromise with the state, he did not gain all
the advantages that accrued to those who joined the party or came from more
favoured social backgrounds :
A´gnes : My husband, he belonged to the young post-war generation. He never joined the
party, but I think he was considered part of the technical stratum, a really good
specialist. When he worked in the factory, he was able to strike the right note with
the workers, and he had a good relationship with his staﬀ, and in an odd way he
was considered some sort of outstanding worker … Basically, they considered him
to be a great specialist, and I think it was for this one reason that they kept him on,
despite the fact that he didn’t sympathize with the Communist regime at all, he
didn’t agree with it.
James : Did this cause you problems?
A´gnes : Perhaps, from a certain point of view, in that those who were party members got
higher salaries. They received all sorts of advantages, they could go on holiday, go
abroad, their pay was higher, but for us it was much more important that we could
look at ourselves in the mirror in the morning.
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The strategies used by those from ‘intellectual ’ backgrounds to ensure upward
mobility were determined by their ambiguous social position, sandwiched
between ‘x-class ’ and ‘worker-peasant ’ students. On one hand, they were not
required to resort to extreme forms of reinvention such as practising downward
social mobility or joining the party (as x-class students were). Nevertheless, they
realized that they would have to develop their public image. The state provided
oﬃcial contexts in which these students could improve their autobiographies
through minor displays of loyalty. In 1952, Erzse´bet demonstrated her support for
the regime by carrying out First Aid ‘community service ’ (ta´rsadalmia´munka) as
part of the preparation against possible invasion from Tito’s Yugoslavia (the
‘ imperialist attack ’) : ‘So to assist the possibility I did First Aid courses, which at
that time was considered as preparation against the imperialist attack. And was
taken as a political good point. ’ If students refused these activities, they experi-
enced diﬃculties in gaining university places :
Tama´s : So I had great diﬃculties once, at the end of the second year, when I had my
e´rettse´gi [A-level equivalent]. There were some military barracks they constructed
and this secretary [of the Communist Party at his school] was organizing some
voluntary labour for us to do in our spare time. I just wanted to concentrate on
my studies and get a good grade, and I knew if I didn’t get good grades I wasn’t
‘politically mature ’ enough to carry on with my studies. That was my only way to
go forward, and I was almost expelled from the school, because I refused to
participate in this voluntary work.
Unlike ‘x-class ’ students, these respondents did not need to renounce or
completely repress their pasts. They were aware, however, that their chances
would be improved if they refashioned their family’s history into a suitable for-
mat. Many had a keen sense of the acceptable contours of Communist history
and developed ways to remould their own life story into politically appropriate
versions of the past. Csaba, for example, realized that his true place of birth might
create diﬃculties. Like other respondents who had lived in outlying eastern areas
of Hungary which were no longer part of Hungary after the war (students who
originally came from northern Transylvania had the same problem), his presence
in Hungary might have suggested that his family had ﬂed in the face of the
‘ liberating ’ Red Army. Not wishing to be seen as a ‘reactionary ’ who had sought
to escape discovery by Soviet troops, he implied that he had always lived on
Hungary’s western border with Austria in Ko˝szeg :
Csaba: I didn’t lie. I wrote down what my origin was, that I had an e´rettse´gi [A-level
equivalent], things like this. My family environment, my brothers, things like
this. There was something sensitive in my CV, which was ridiculous, but it was a
sensitive issue. We lived in Ungva´r in 1945 when the Russian front came. Ungva´r
is in the east, it’s now part of Ukraine, and we ﬂed from Ungva´r. So I couldn’t
write that we ﬂed, because then they asked why … you ﬂed from the Soviet army.
It sounded bad, so I just wrote that I got my e´rettse´gi in Ko˝szeg and that was it. I left
Ungva´r out.
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Ma´rton worried that he would not get into university as he had family members
who had emigrated to France. Relatives abroad were seen as sources of potential
ideological contamination, or as evidence of a family’s antipathy towards the
regime. He could not hide regular correspondence so therefore reversed the
direction of his family’s migration, pretending he had come from a French
working-class family who had chosen to emigrate to Communist Hungary :
Ma´rton: A correspondence with the Western countries was not taken as a good point.
Two siblings of my father lived in France, and during the Ra´kosi period I got
round this by – and this is true – by beginning each autobiography (o¨ne´letrajz)
stating that I came from a French working-class family. Then nobody gave me
any diﬃculties about the fact that I received letters from France, nobody asked
me any questions … it was always a habit with me to begin every autobiography
with that.
Whereas the above respondents chose to polish their autobiographies through
minor omissions or adjustments, some from intellectual backgrounds sought not
to hide their pasts, but to comment on them in such a way as to make them
appear sympathetic, useful, or reliable to the regime. Respondents developed
‘class conscious ’ autobiographies which publicly recognized their liabilities,
highlighted their biographical assets, and demonstrated fundamental loyalty.
Politically or socially stigmatized members of the family were demonized, rela-
tives who had pasts sympathetic to the Communist regime were stressed, and
‘ intellectual ’ rather than ‘bourgeois ’ roots were emphasized. Such subtly organ-
ized narratives could thus turn ambiguous and often complex backgrounds into
politically acceptable biographies. This phenomenon was not conﬁned to the
Hungarian middle classes : a study on social mobility in Bulgaria noted that
members of the former pre-Communist elite learnt how to demonize members of
their families in their public biographies by using suﬃciently class conscious lan-
guage such as ‘oppressor ’ or ‘petty-bourgeois philistine ’.35 One Hungarian
middle-class respondent, A´da´m, who had joined the party immediately after the
war, reported that if he was prepared openly to present his bourgeois heritage as a
liability he was accepted: ‘ I always started my written CV with the statement that
I am from a bourgeois family … I was never trying to hide my origin … and they
said that, ‘‘ A´da´m, we know about that, and that’s alright. ’’’
In some cases, middle-class respondents had internalized these politically
acceptable biographical formulas to such an extent that they reproduced them
when asked about their family in interviews conducted in the post-Communist
period. Fu¨lo¨p came from a wealthy manufacturing background in Kosice : his
family had owned two factories and employed between twenty and thirty people.
At the beginning of the interview, when asked about his social background, he
marginalized this part of his family’s history. He preferred to emphasize his
35 Koleva, Between testimony and power, p. 4.
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‘ intellectual ’ roots and presented his father in a light that would have made him
a sympathetic ﬁgure to the Communist regime:
James : Tell me about your family background.
Fu¨lo¨p : Can I talk about the origins of my family? It’s important that I do, as mainly
because of my parents, before 1956, I could say that I was an intellectual … my
grandfather was the owner of a large joinery business, a large manufacturer. But
my father came to Pest to go to the technical university, so he became an intel-
lectual (e´rtelmise´gi) in Budapest … In the 1920s my father became an engineer and
worked as an employee (alkalmazott). Mainly he was employed in a large tram
factory, later he was their director of trade. That was up until 1945. From there on
our history has been pretty stormy. In 1944 the war began, and the Arrow Cross
[the Hungarian Fascist Party] took power. That was when Miklo´s Horthy and his
old bourgeois gang (re´gi polga´ri garnitu´ra) were expelled. The far right Arrow Cross
took power in the country … and they took all the country’s factories to bits and
sent them westwards from here [i.e. to Nazi Germany]. There was no opposition
here, no Soviet troops. [My father] was at that time the top director in the com-
pany and he did everything he could to intervene so that … they didn’t take away
the machinery. The factory where he worked wasn’t bombed, so the owner and
the company had much to thank him for. Despite this, a charge was brought
against him for supporting the Arrow Cross and he was put on trial after the war. It
is true that he served them – if you put it in quotation marks – as he was a member
of an Arrow Cross factory committee, but he did this at the request of the factory
owners to save the ﬁrm. Really and truly he saved the factory, but nevertheless he
was put on trial as a member of the Arrow Cross … The real reason for this was
that he was their director of trade … and someone wanted his position … he was
put on trial after the war, but it was not a judicial trial, but a political scrutinizing
committee (igazolo´ bizottsa´g) … which only approved a person if they hadn’t served
the far right regime. If they had worked for them, then they had to be removed
from their posts. If they had heavily compromised themselves then in that case they
went to prison. Now when my father went before the scrutinizing committee he
was able to bring out a defence witness who was able to verify that everything he
did was in the interests of the ﬁrm. There was even a Communist worker who was
arrested for concealing weapons in 1944 who testiﬁed that he owed his life to my
father. Since there had been martial law, the Communist who hid the weapons
would probably have been executed, but my father had an acquaintance in the
police, who was able to arrange it so that this man was allowed to ﬂee, was set free.
So this Communist was really able to thank my father for his life.
His narrative was still shaped by the dictates of Communist ideology. He
immediately directed attention away from his upper-middle-class roots to his
father’s status as an ‘ intellectual ’ who was an ‘employee ’ rather than an owner. He
then used ‘class conscious ’ language to demonize the previous regime as that ‘old
bourgeois gang’. He might have been expected to avoid the delicate subject of his
father’s suspected collaboration with the Hungarian fascist regime in an interview
with a British interviewer in post-Communist Hungary. However, it would have
been impossible for him to sidestep this subject in aCommunist era autobiography,
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as his father had been accused of collaboration during the oﬃcial process of
‘political screening’ which followed the Second World War, and this would have
appeared on Fu¨lo¨p’s personal ﬁle. Moreover, his justiﬁcation for his father’s
behaviour was shaped by the post-war Communist adoration of Hungarian
Communist anti-fascist resistance : his father could be excused a superﬁcial form
of collaboration as he had saved a Communist insurgent. Only by marginalizing
his wealthy upper middle-class grandfather in his life story, showing politically
conscious attitudes towards Hungarian history, and explaining away the charge
against his father, could he maintain his family’s classiﬁcation as ‘progressive
intellectuals ’. His self-presentation in the post-Communist period still bore the
marks of the way in which he had refashioned himself to gain upward mobility in
the early Communist period.
Admission into higher education depended not only on one’s public autobi-
ography, but also on the subject and the university to which the prospective
student applied. Decisions about subject and institution might reﬂect an assess-
ment of one’s biographical liabilities rather than one’s academic interests. Those
from negatively deﬁned backgrounds avoided politicized subjects and prestigious
institutions and chose courses where expertise was in short supply.36
Humanities courses were considered politically sensitive, both as they contained
a considerable amount of Marxist theory, and as they were often preparation for
careers (such as journalism or teaching) where class consciousness was deemed
particularly important. Lo´ra´nt, whose father had been a successful businessman,
realized that his background might bar him from these subjects :
Lo´ra´nt : I wanted to become a theatrical director, but, for political reasons, that was a
totally hopeless ambition of mine. Since I was quite good at, and interested in, the
natural sciences, and that appeared to be a more neutral area … I went to the
technical university and I qualiﬁed there … [it] was a great relief, because being
at the high school for drama, would have meant, if I had been accepted, it would
have meant at least regular lip service to Communist values and ideas, and I don’t
think I could have really done it.
Technical subjects associated with the industrial expansion of Stalinist
Hungary were frequently a refuge for middle-class people with negatively viewed
backgrounds. So many students were required to ﬁll these courses that class-based
entrance requirements were diﬃcult to uphold :
James : How did you decide which university to go to?
Fu¨lo¨p : It was easy enough to get a place for engineering, because the vacancies for
engineering had suddenly expanded. In the Ra´kosi period here, loads of technical
36 Respondents outlined various sources of information about university entrance. Most referred to
informal methods such as hearsay, or observed what had happened to students in the year above them.
Other interviewees said that their teachers had given them advice about the political suitability of
particular subjects or institutions. A brochure ( fu¨zet) which listed the number of students required by
the state in diﬀerent disciplines was mentioned by only a few respondents.
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people were required … so it was relatively easy to get in. I had a bad letter of
reference … I had been to a church school and I was never a member of the
Communist youth movement, so it was not deﬁnite, it was just in the hands of the
state. I had loads of bad references, but I was very glad when I was admitted.
Respondents also reported that as a member of the old middle class one was
less likely to be admitted to university if one studied the same subject as one’s
parents, since the Communist state was particularly sensitive to the preservation
of professional traditions within families. Franciska was stigmatized both because
she came from a prosperous middle-class family and because her father had
fought in the Hungarian army during the Second World War. She was barred
from studying the same subject as her father because the entrance committee had
wanted to prevent the establishment of ‘dynasties ’. However, she still gained a
place at university in a similar subject :37
James : So tell me about your decision to go to university.
Franciska: Well, I always wanted to go to university but I wanted to get on to a veterinary
course … And I was told, no, no, no, you can’t go there because we don’t want
to create dynasties of veterinarians. That was the only reason. Because your
father is a veterinarian, therefore you cannot be a veterinarian. So I got a place
at the agricultural university [instead].
Most middle-class respondents interviewed for this project were able to ensure
their own access to higher education. Like their counterparts in Czechoslovakia,
their presence at universities was not seriously challenged, even in the early 1950s.
Unlike prospective Czechoslovak students, they were faced with a Communist
state that had oﬃcially decreed their exclusion and set up mechanisms to mar-
ginalize them. However, respondents reported that the state interpreted social
classiﬁcations in very ﬂexible terms; it oﬀered them opportunities to shed pre-
vious bourgeois identities, remake themselves and become politically acceptable
Communist citizens. Within this system, respondents developed a complex
understanding of the extent to which their family background aﬀected their life
chances. They in turn developed sophisticated strategies in order to ensure their
successful passage into higher education: hiding information about their back-
grounds; showing class-conscious attitudes towards politically stigmatized re-
latives ; engaging in minor acts of loyalty and avoiding politicized courses and
institutions from which their pasts barred them.
37 CURPH also reported that many students failed to get their ﬁrst choice of subject (usually owing
to strict quotas insisted on in the plan). Of the Hungarian e´migre´s they interviewed in the United
States, only 43 per cent of students from all classes obtained a university place for their ﬁrst choice
subject prior to 1956. This ﬁgure does not include all those students who had rejected their ﬁrst choice
of subject even prior to application as they realized their ambitions were not compatible with
the requirements of the Communist state; see Murray, Higher education (report), p. 23.
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I I I
There has been little interest from either historians or social scientists in the way
in which the former Hungarian middle class were altered by the experience of
Communism. In part, this has been due to the assumption that, as victims of dis-
crimination, they withdrew into ‘ internal exile ’ and maintained pre-Communist
values in private settings.38 Yet the middle class did not just withdraw; their desire
for social betterment combined with the state’s need for their expertise placed
them at the centre of the Stalinist modernization of Hungary. The discovery that
many were indeed successful raises the question of the extent to which individuals
were forced by such achievements to rethink their identities as Communist citi-
zens. Recent studies have highlighted the ways in which, for other social groups,
involvement in the Communist system had a major impact on self-perception and
personal identity.39 There has been virtually no work, however, on how the ex-
perience of Communism aﬀected the outlook of oﬃcially marginalized groups.
This section will analyse the personae that respondents adopted in order to
make sense of, or make bearable to themselves, their experience of upward
mobility in the early Communist period.40 It will analyse how they fashioned
acceptable stories both about the opportunities the state had presented to them
and their responses to those oﬀers. These narratives were frequently ambiguous
or misleading ; successful careerists would categorize themselves as victims whilst
those who were discriminated against characterized themselves as being ‘needed’
by the Communist state. Such apparent contradictions are key to understanding
the ways in which the middle class came to terms with their own achievements
after 1948.
For most conservative and Catholic respondents, social mobility was a moral
issue, as it required an engagement with a regime which they considered an illegit-
imate, un-Hungarian, and foreign imposition. Some therefore preferred to pre-
serve an identity as a marginalized victim, rather than morally contaminate
38 See Szele´nyi et al., Socialist entrepreneurs, ch. 7. He argues that ‘bourgeois values ’ had been sta-
tioned in ‘parking orbits ’ during the Stalinist period, ready to emerge unscathed at a point of political
and economic liberalization. See also Ga´ti and Horva´th, ‘A ko¨ze´poszta´ly ’.
39 Earlier ‘ totalitarian’ writers have assumed that the average Communist citizen wore a public
mask of compliance whilst maintaining their ‘ true feelings’ only in private. Rejecting this simplistic
division, social historians since the end of the Cold War have investigated the way in which the
experience of Communism altered groups’ value systems and identities. Most of the best work has
been done on the Soviet Union. See, for example, Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic mountain : Stalinism as a
civilisation (Berkeley, 1995), and Sheila Fitzpatrick, ed., Stalinism: new directions (London, 2000).
40 It was diﬃcult to assess the extent to which the presence of a young western researcher from a
British university would aﬀect the testimony given by interviewees. As a foreigner, respondents gave
me considerable detail about their experiences, since they assumed a low level of knowledge about
Hungarian history. However, it is likely that the narratives they gave were similar to those they might
have given to others in their own society. First, interviews were as unstructured as possible, in order to
allow interviewees to frame responses to questions in their own terms. Secondly, the structure of
respondents’ responses often suggested that they were not answering my question directly, but en-
gaging with their own agenda, or a debate current in their society, of which my question had merely
reminded them.
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themselves through an attempt at educational or professional advancement. Ildiko´
was oﬀered a place at the Marxist-Leninist university but asserted that nobody
who was a ‘real Catholic ’ could attend such an ideological institution. She pre-
ferred to present herself as an anti-Communist martyr, rejecting opportunities the
state presented to her and enduring poverty to maintain her integrity. Eventually,
when she reconsidered her options and decided to attend evening university, she
characterized all her fellow students as collaborators with the system:
James : So do you remember, at that time, why you said no to the Marxist-Leninist university ?
Ildiko´ : Of course, of course, because I hated them. So that’s why. Listen, nobody who was
a real Catholic could accept that. And then when I got to this evening university I
realized – later on – that all the people who came with me, 80 per cent of them,
came from the A´VO [Communist state security service] … one of them was very
cruel and hit people in the eye [during torture], and that was a ‘nice colleague of
mine’ (said sarcastically), but I only knew that afterwards, after 1990. So, what else
can I say about why I said no to Marxism-Leninism?
James : Was it an opportunity or a temptation?
Ildiko´ : No, never. Never. I said, ‘No, ’ and then they wanted to get me into the A´VO. You
could say no, I could always survive. Even when my father died. But when my
father was alive, he was on a sege´dmunka´s (unskilled worker’s) salary, and he could
always get zsı´roskenye´r (bread and dripping).
Despite this fear of moral contamination, many of these respondents did decide
to attend university. However, they constructed the story of their upward mobility
in such a way as to explain away the ethical implications of the compromises they
had made to ensure their success. Erzse´bet’s family were Catholic, conservative,
and connected with the previous regime; her father had held a high-ranking post
in the ministry of education until being sacked for refusing to join the Hungarian
Workers’ Party :
Erzse´bet : I tr[ied] to gain good points in other directions which didn’t conﬂict with my
conscience, like, for example, to hope for university entrance, if you came from
a so-called middle-class family, that was out of the question. It didn’t matter
how well you had done in your exams, or generally in your schooling, to become
a university student was almost impossible. So to assist the possibility I did First
Aid courses, which at that time was considered as preparation against the im-
perialist attack. And was taken as a political good point. For me it was part of the
preparation for university as I was heading for medical school anyway. So it was
an easy way of gaining so-called political good points without actually being
political. And so I became an instructor in First Aid and that was deﬁnitely
counted. When I ﬁnished school with a gold medal, that alone would not have
allowed me university entry, [but] added to it my First Aid courses, and at that
time my father lost his job and I became a working-class girl. So …
James : So how did that work?
Erzse´bet : Simply because the questionnaire for university entry, amongst other personal
details, asked for occupation of father, and in all honesty I could write down
labourer. They didn’t ask who he was, just who he is. So immediately I became
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a member of the proletariat (laughs). And with good results at school, First Aid, I
got the largest university scholarship, not just a university place.
Like many conservative respondents, her story was often paradoxical ; no
matter how much success she achieved, her self-identity remained that of victim.
She began her narrative by highlighting the complete exclusion she was bound to
suﬀer, claiming that it was impossible for her to go to university as a member of
the former middle class. However, her narrative quickly undercut this initial
assertion; she described not only how she had got to university, but how she
obtained the largest scholarship in her year.
This contradiction should alert us to the importance of victimhood as an
identity for this group. Erzse´bet presented herself in this way as it helped to
explain away the concessions she had made to the state. She began her narrative
by explaining that she was forced into making compromises only because she was
otherwise doomed to exclusion. As a victim, she was relieving herself of ethical
responsibility for her own actions. The remainder of her narrative reinforced
this point ; her account was an attempt to explain how the concessions she had
made did not taint her (‘didn’t conﬂict with my conscience ’). For example, it
was important for her to maintain a distinction between morally acceptable
and unacceptable forms of compromise. Despite the fact that she gained a gold
medal for ‘community service ’ and admitted that this helped her, she emphasized
that it was not a political decision but ‘an easy way of gaining so called political
good points without being actually political ’. It was true that this type of social
activity (ta´rsadalmia´munka or ‘community service ’41) did not require individuals
to carry out explicitly political work on behalf of the regime. Respondents
knew, however, that it was a method of demonstrating loyalty towards the system.
She therefore needed to assert that it was a natural choice as she was ‘going to
medical school anyway’. Even when involved in clearly politicized activities, she
needed to deny that they had tainted her. Only as an apolitical victim, forced by
virtue of her excluded position to make compromises with the state, could she ﬁnd
an identity that made her experience of success morally manageable.
Stories of victimhood dominated conservative testimony. Certainly, they had
multiple languages of persecution on which to draw to construct their life stories.
They were repeatedly told they would be victims in the anti-bourgeois rhetoric of
the Communist state (especially prior to the early 1960s) and experienced dis-
crimination in many other areas of their lives. They later became celebrated
for surviving marginalization in anti-Communist nationalist rhetoric after 1989.
Yet we should not take these victim stories, which have often been used as evi-
dence for the Communist state’s capacity to persecute and exclude, at face value.
These narratives do not provide evidence of the state’s power, but rather illustrate
individuals’ attitudes and responses to that power. Conservatives drew on the
41 For other examples of community service, see Lada´nyi, Re´tegezo˝de´s e´s szelekcio´, p. 119.
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identity of victim in order to come to terms with the moral implications of their
success at upward mobility.
Other middle-class respondents constructed very diﬀerent stories about how
they had achieved success. These rejected the idea that upward mobility under
Communism was a problematic ethical issue. They did not associate their pro-
fessional achievements with assisting an immoral foreign regime (even though
many disliked Soviet inﬂuence in their country). Rather, they valued their role in
rebuilding Hungary after the war and in modernizing the country, regardless of
the power structures that surrounded them. Many of these respondents under-
stood their experience of social mobility as ‘being needed’ and found meaning in
their social usefulness. These included a number of respondents who had joined
the party. However, they also included those who disliked the Hungarian
Workers’ Party but identiﬁed with the leftist language of collective national
rebuilding.42
Krisztina was Jewish and left-leaning in her politics. She disliked the
Hungarian Workers’ Party itself, but identiﬁed with their anti-fascist rhetoric and
considered them less anti-Semitic than other post-war political groups. However,
she was oﬃcially stigmatized after 1948 as her father had been a director of the
timber section of the Austro-Hungarian bank and her mother had worked in the
stock exchange:
Krisztina : I learnt German, French, English, art appreciation and went to the best school
in Budapest, and the idea was I would go to a ﬁnishing school in Switzerland.
We had a cook and a maid. But my husband’s family had a cook and two
maids !
James : So how did the Communists describe your family ?
Krisztina : Very badly … capitalists.
Despite the fact that she was stigmatized owing to her rich upper-middle-class
background, she never presented herself as a victim. Rather, she recognized that
despite oﬃcial rhetoric, her skills made her necessary for the new economy.
Moreover, ‘being needed’ provided her with an identity with which she was
comfortable :
James : So how did the Communist state describe you?
Krisztina : Me? They had very few people who could speak three languages. They needed
them. And I had a very good job, because my boss couldn’t speak any [other
languages], only Hungarian, so I was needed.
42 Others scholars have noted that the generation who were socialized by the Communist state in
the 1940s and 1950s often identiﬁed with the notion of collective solidarity and post-war rebuilding,
even if they disliked their local Communist party. By contrast, the younger generation socialized in the
1960s and 1970s absorbed western ideas about individual identity and expression which undermined
the Communist state’s ability to construct collective solidarities. See, for example, Anna Rotkirsch, The
man question : loves and lives in late 20th century Russia. University of Helsinki – Department of Social Policy Research
Reports (Helsinki, 2000).
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In contrast to conservatives, there was a constant tension in these life stories
between the desire to ‘be needed’ and the actual experiences of discrimination
these respondents endured as members of an oﬃcially unwanted class. Benedek
was a Communist Party member who wanted to integrate himself into the intel-
lectual elite. He was shocked when he was twice excluded from scholarships
because of his class background and his association with those implicated in the
Rajk show trial.43 Rather than use experiences of discrimination to present him-
self as a ‘victim’, he instead clung to the expectation he would be ‘accepted ’ :
Benedek: I went to the technical university in Budapest for one year to do electrical
engineering, and I was nominated to go to the Soviet Union. In 1949, when the
Rajk show trial came, as a result of the Rajk process, they eliminated all unre-
liable elements. As I was of non-proletarian origin, I was sent away … I was
excluded ﬁrst in ’49 from going to the Soviet Union, for the second time in ’54.
So this rejection obviously psychologically created this sort of thing that, as a
very faithful Marxist … if you’re not accepted then you begin to wonder who is
accepted.
Even when these respondents were persecuted, they did not take refuge in the
identity of victim, but rather found ways to reconcile their suﬀering with the sense
of being needed. Krisztina was imprisoned for attempting to leave the country.
Instead of using the experience to bear witness to the exclusion of the former
middle class, she described the prison as a ‘marvellous bed and breakfast ’. She
had been able to manipulate the prison authorities who had always ‘needed’ her :
Krisztina : We were in that marvellous bed and breakfast place (laughs), and the military
commander says, we were in cells, and he said, ‘ is there anybody who can cook
for thirty people? ’ and I said, ‘ I can cook for thirty people. ’ ‘Alright, you come
with us. ’ And I said, ‘before I start cooking I want a shower’. You had only so
much water a day for washing. They said, ‘alright, there is a shower in here,
you can have a shower’. And I said to the soldier, I said to him, ‘would you be
so kind and go to the cell where I came from and bring down my husband’s
shirts and I will wash them while I have a shower?’ They accepted that. So we
were clean. And I cooked. I think nobody could eat my cooking (laughs).
Because I was brought up as a princess. I didn’t have to do anything because
I had servants. Then the head of that institution came down and said, ‘ I see
that you can type and you have shorthand and you are a secretary. ’ And I said,
‘ I used to be, but lately I’ve become a cook. ’ And he said, ‘you won’t be a cook
because I need a secretary and you come up and you work for me’. So I worked
for a week as his secretary, and on perhaps the third day he said to me, ‘I have
deported your husband. ’ I said, ‘you wouldn’t do that to me – to deport my
husband to another prison and I can’t say goodbye to him’. ‘Yes, I deported
him. ’ And I was taken back to my cell and my husband was sitting there. They
gave us a cell for the two of us as a reward because I was a good secretary.
43 In 1949, La´szlo´ Rajk, the former Communist minister of the interior, was arrested, put on trial,
and then executed.
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Through these descriptions of interactions with authority ﬁgures, Krisztina
revealed her particular construction of Communist power. For her, the prison
was not a symbol of oppression but a space in which she was needed as a cook and
secretary. Whereas some would have seen such activities inside prison as a form of
collaboration, for Krisztina it was a way she could be of use to the state in return
for occasional rewards. She rejected the notion that she was a victim. She em-
ployed the cliche´ of the unpredictable totalitarian state common in conservative
testimony, reporting the commander’s comment that he had arbitrarily deported
her husband. However, she then undermined this victim narrative, revealing that
she was in fact rewarded for her labours with a conjugal cell. For Krisztina,
co-operating was not a form of moral compromise. Rather, it was a legitimate
kind of behaviour in a society which she believed still needed her, even whilst it
persecuted her.
A further group of respondents, mainly from liberal backgrounds, viewed their
social mobility as the result of an unspoken bargain between the old middle class
and the state : they would be allowed limited educational and workplace oppor-
tunities as long as they conﬁned themselves to narrow professional ambitions
and remained politically inactive. They therefore rejected both the identities of
victimhood and being needed. Rather, they saw themselves as merely ‘ tolerated ’
(megtu˝rt) :
James : How did the Communist regime describe your social position?
Anna: We were a borderline case. We weren’t ‘enemies of people ’ ; they tolerated us
(megtu˝rtek).
It is true that during the early Communist period many from the old middle
class experienced both opportunities and discrimination as ‘borderline cases ’.
However, it was only this group who used this story to make sense of their
experience of upward mobility. They drew on this narrative as, unlike con-
servatives, they did not see all compromises with the state, and minor displays of
loyalty that ensured their professional status, as morally degrading. Rather, the
concessions they made were an acceptable consequence of this silent bargain
between state and the old bourgeoisie. Csaba, for example, entered into what he
saw as an unspoken agreement with the Communist state, in which, in return for
being tolerated, he would refrain from public dissent. As an artist, this had
required him to desist from making explicitly political statements ; instead, he
took up the role of the technically proﬁcient craftsman:
James : Were there things in your past which you wanted to keep secret from the Communists ?
Csaba: Of course, I didn’t brag about going to a church school, I didn’t brag about it, but
of course they knew, because they knew everything about everyone, but I didn’t
make that or myself conspicuous. They made me feel that if I stayed quiet and I
behaved myself, then things would be alright. They would tolerate me. In a sense,
this attested to their tolerant treatment of me, but despite this, I had to stay silent.
Now I trained as a painter, an artist, but I was not used for propaganda and it was
not a career where a person had to say a lot, but rather did his craft. It wasn’t
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really diﬃcult to always play the craftsman. I didn’t take part in the life of the
party, nor did I take part in any sort of movement, but there were obligatory
things. The May 1st parade was obligatory during my university years.
However, there were ethical limits to the strategies these respondents were
prepared to adopt to achieve their success. For conservatives, any act of
compromise was seen as morally degrading. Liberals, however, were prepared to
co-operate with the state, but only within certain moral boundaries. Deﬁning
acceptable levels of compromise was therefore an important feature of their
narratives of upward mobility. Csaba (above) was prepared to display a superﬁcial
loyalty, but it was also necessary for him to indicate the limit of his deference ; he
had been prepared to attend parades, but he would not take part in the life of the
party or ‘any sort of movement ’. In the next quotation, Fu¨lo¨p admitted that he
was prepared to be seen at May Day marches in order to keep his university
place. However, by describing his quick exit from the ranks, he sought to dem-
onstrate how perfunctory his obedience was :
Fu¨lo¨p : There were times when I went on the parade, there were times when I didn’t.
I should mention a nice episode. The ﬁrst time I am sure I marched was when I
was glad that I had been admitted to university and I didn’t want to get a bad mark
against my name. That was May 1st 1952. We left the university, everybody
holding a banner in their hands, or a red ﬂag, or the national colours … I was very
annoyed, because I knew that if you were holding a ﬂag it was impossible to leave
the procession, because it would be very suspicious if you disappeared down a side
street … However, by a lucky accident, I was able to escape from the procession
because we marched down a small alley and there was a toilet with an open door.
And I went in with the intention of leaving the ﬂag there and going out. That was a
lovely moment, as when I went in, there were already a load of other banners
there, so I wasn’t the ﬁrst person who had gone into the toilet with a ﬂag and came
out through another door without one. Having left my ﬂag behind, I disappeared
into a side street.
I V
By the early 1950s, the Communist state recognized that it needed the expertise of
the former middle class. However, it could not openly admit ideologically unac-
ceptable social groups into the new elite. Respondents realized that the state was
prepared to oﬀer them the chance of advancement within the system only as long
as they were prepared to present themselves as committed Communist citizens.
They developed a variety of strategies to ensure their success : practising down-
ward social mobility to become ‘working class ’, remoulding their family histories
or acting out displays of loyalty.
Respondents’ testimonies refuted the idea that the middle class withdrew into
private settings and emerged in 1989 unscathed by Communism: rather they
were co-opted into themodernization ofHungary and they entered into a dynamic
interaction with the new state that forced them to decide what sort of Communist
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citizens they wished to be. They were given chances to gain upward mobility and
many succeeded. As a result they were forced to come to terms with the fact that
a system that discriminated against them (and that many disliked ideologically)
had nevertheless provided them with opportunities and achievements.
In examining these stories of successful social mobility, this article has chal-
lenged the idea that descriptions of victimhood, ‘being needed ’ or ‘being toler-
ated’, actually illustrated the state’s power to exclude individuals from, or co-opt
groups into, the new elite. Far from being objective accounts ‘ from below’, they
were manifestations of the identities which middle-class respondents took on
in order to explain their experience of success in the Communist system in a way
that was acceptable to themselves. Thus, party members and left-leaning re-
spondents testiﬁed to their ‘being needed’ (even when they had also experienced
exclusion and marginalization) because they wanted to think they had played a
part in the collective rebuilding of Hungary after the war. Where respondents
testiﬁed to their status as victims of the system they were seldom simply victims,
since many were given opportunities for advancement. Rather, they chose vic-
timhood to explain away the awkward moral implications of the compromises
they had made to achieve their successes in the early Communist period.
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